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The following scenarios are familiar to many consumers in today's marketplace:
• Your credit card bill payment is received 1 day after the due date.
• You have to cancel a hotel reservation the day before you were scheduled to arrive.
• You are 2 days late in returning the DVD of a newrelease movie rental.
• You book a tee time for your foursome at the local golf course and then fail to show up.
These are all situations in which customers may find themselves facing penalties from service organizations. In fact, examples of organizations imposing penalties on customers are common across many service industries: cancellation penalties applied by hotels and doctors; no-show fees charged by restaurants and golf courses; reticketing and schedule change fees assessed by airlines; penalties imposed by banks for early loan payment, inadequate minimum balances, or overdrafts; late-return fees collected by movie and other rental companies; restocking fees levied by retailers for returned merchandise; penalties exacted by telecommunications carriers for failure to meet minimum usage levels; and so on. This study examines how customers view such "punishments" and how they respond to service organizations' penalties.
Thirty nine banks surveyed in both 1995 and 1998 by Consumer Action increased late fees by 74% from $12.53 on average in 1995 to an average of $21.82 three years later. In addition to a late fee, once a cardholder has missed the deadline for one or two bills, he or she faces annual percentage rates commonly greater than 20%. (Credit Card Management, May 1999, pp. 80, 82) Meanwhile, customers' complaints about penalties are also on the rise and, in some cases, have resulted in legal action against the service organization that imposed the penalties. For example, Blockbuster Inc., one of the world's leading providers of videos, DVDs, and video games, recently settled a class-action lawsuit alleging that its late fees were excessive and unfair. The negative effects of penalties on customers have been widely reported and discussed in the business press and trade publications (see examples above). Service organizations have been harshly criticized for their use of penalties in general, for deriving a considerable portion of their total revenue from penalties, or for setting prices relatively low and then using penalties to make up the difference and maintain profit levels.
On the other hand, in defense of their use of penalties, service organizations commonly point to one of the unique characteristics of services-namely, perishability. Unlike goods, services (especially those involving face-to-face interactions) typically cannot be inventoried for future use; therefore, efficient management of supply and demand is critical to the successful operation of service organizations. So when customers fail to abide by the original purchase promises and policies, these actions may undermine an organization's ability to effectively manage supply and demand. Similarly, penalties are often levied to compensate the service organization for additional resources and administrative efforts that may be required or for transaction, risk, and/or opportunity costs that are incurred due to customer actions that would otherwise prove to be detrimental to the firm. Therefore, in response to customers' undesirable behaviors, service organizations must use penalties to recover from potential losses.
Some scholars staunchly defend the appropriateness of organizations' disciplinary actions on customers whose behaviors may be harmful to the enterprise. For instance, Sorrell (1994, p. 917) argues that organizations' actions unfavorable to customers can be legitimized when "deference to the customers is likely to cause business failure or significant loss of profitability while preventing at most minor harm to the customers." In other words, punishing customers for their "misdeeds" may be proper and even necessary under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, service organizations seem to take a reactive stance to developing and managing penalties. Taking a more proactive approach by understanding the effects of penalties on customers, managing customers' perceptions of penalties, and establishing sound penalty policies could offer advantages for service organizations.
Despite the importance of all the issues surrounding customers' responses to service organizations' use of penalties as well as the lively discussions in the popular press, this topic has received very little attention from academia, as noted by McCarthy and Fram (2000) . This study investigates customers'responses to service organizations'penalties and develops an integrated framework based on concepts from attribution theory, social justice theory, and expectancy disconfirmation. In examining customers' responses, we consider penalty attributes, attributions, expectancy disconfirmation, fairness perceptions, emotions, and dissatisfaction judgments. Specifically, this research attempts to address the following questions: (a) What attributes of a penalty might influence customers' evaluations? (b) What is the role of attributions in customers' responses to penalties? (c) How do cognitive and affective evaluations affect customers' dissatisfaction with penalties?
To examine customers' responses to penalties, we develop and test a model using cross-sectional data collected via an online survey using the critical incident technique across a variety of service industries. This is the first study to use a theory-based, comprehensive model that includes penalty attributes and attributions as antecedents of both cognitive and affective responses and then tests the model using empirical data based on customers' actual penalty experiences and evaluations. Prior research on penalties was exploratory in nature; it primarily focused on differences on demographic characteristics and did not consider important variables such as penalty attributes, attributions, disconfirmation, three types of perceived justice, or affective responses (McCarthy and Fram 2000) .
Although a primary focus of the services marketing literature has been on customers' responses to critical incidents in which the service provider has failed the customer in some way (e.g., DeWitt and Brady 2003; Mattila and Patterson 2004; McColl-Kennedy and Sparks 2003; Smith and Bolton 1998) , this is one of the first studies to examine situations in which customers have failed the service organization (by violating its policies and thereby incurring a penalty). Therefore, a unique contribution of our research is to explore how well-established relationships among variables such as attribution, disconfirmation, perceived justice, emotion, and satisfaction may differ when the tables are turned and the customer is the "culprit" and the service organization is the "victim." For example, attributions of stability may play a different role in penalty situations than in service failure situations because the likelihood of the same incident occurring again (i.e., another penalty) depends on customers' predictions about their own actions going forward rather than on their expectations about the organization's future behavior.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Penalties as an Economic Form of Punishment
Various disciplines offer different perspectives on punishment. A behaviorist view of punishment would point to operant conditioning based on the three-term model of stimulus-response-stimulus (S-R-S) learning such that the stimulus following the response changes the probability of whether the response will occur again. Behaviorists believe that an addition or an elimination of a positive or negative stimulus influences the recipient's behaviors, and the use of a negative stimulus (i.e., punishment) will reduce undesirable behaviors. Based on Skinner's learning theory, social exchange theorists (Homans 1961 ) also suggest that individuals will repeat behaviors that have led to rewards and avoid behaviors that have led to punishments in the past. When the stimulus is removed, the effect on behavior will also be eliminated.
The economic theory of deterrence, which has been widely applied in the fields of criminal justice, economics, and law, also provides another perspective on punishment and suggests that the prospect of having to pay for damages can have a deterring effect on individuals' behaviors that led to negative consequences (Kaplan, Reckers, and Reynolds 1986; Polinsky and Shavell 1998) . According to the theory, an individual will refrain from engaging in a certain behavior if he or she knows that he or she is going to be punished for that behavior.
Organizational behavior scholars have examined the role of punishment in the context of supervisor-subordinate relationships and have defined punishment as an organization's treatment of applying negative consequences to or removing positive consequences from subordinates to decrease the frequency of their undesirable behaviors (Butterfield, Trevino, and Ball 1996) . This definition postulates that individuals learn appropriate behaviors by receiving positive or negative responses. In customer-firm relationships, organizations often use penalties as an economic form of punishment to discourage undesirable behaviors by customers. Therefore, following McCarthy and Fram (2000) , we define a penalty as the imposition of a fee on customers who fail to complete the original purchase agreement.
Although penalties (i.e., economic sanctions) are a very common type of punitive action employed by service firms, other forms of punishment such as denial of services or removal of privileges may also be used. Furthermore, in addition to discouraging undesirable behaviors by customers, penalties may also serve to help service firms recover from losses caused by customers, to deter undesirable customer segments (e.g., banks with strict penalty policies for customers whose accounts fall below a minimum balance or who write bad checks), or as a means of generating additional revenue. However, the examination of other (noneconomic) forms of punitive actions by service organizations and the exploration of motivations behind service firms' penalty policies are not the focus of this study but do offer interesting avenues for future research.
The conceptual framework used in this study is shown in Figure 1 . The framework considers the effects of penalty attributes (severity, flexibility, and adequacy of explanation) and attributions (locus, stability, and controllability) on perceived justice (distributive, procedural, and interactional), disconfirmation, and (negative) emotion as well as the effects of these cognitive and affective antecedents on customers' dissatisfaction with penalty incidents.
The Effects of Penalty Attributes
Three attributes of penalties-severity, flexibility, and adequacy of explanation-are examined in this study to investigate their impact on customers' responses.
Severity. Because of the potential negative outcomes associated with punitive actions (e.g., resentment, dissatisfaction, and defection), severity of punishment has been an important issue in the literature. There is no single formula to determine the ideal level of punishment severity. In general, more intense punishment should generate a higher deterrence effect, and an additional unit in the negative domain should have a larger effect on consequences than in the positive domain (Folkes 1988; Homans 1961) . Thus, customers are expected to be highly involved in the cognitive processing of the penalty amount, and their affective responses would likely be influenced by the severity of the penalty. Overall, we expect severity of the penalty to have a negative influence on customers' responses.
Flexibility. Another attribute of penalties is the service organization's flexibility in dealing with customers during penalty incidents. Flexibility refers to the adaptability of procedures to reflect individual circumstances (Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) . Previous studies on service failures and recoveries found that organizations that use flexible procedures to accommodate individual circumstances are better at recovering from service failures (Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault 1990; Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999) . The role of flexibility in customer evaluations is found to loom larger when outcomes are in a negative valence (e.g., penalty) than when they are in a positive valence (e.g., reward) (Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; Welbourne 1998) . Based on previous studies (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) , we would expect service organizations' flexible handling of penalties to have a (positive) influence on customers' responses.
Adequacy of explanation.
Causal accounts (i.e., explanation of the cause) are considered important in reducing distress produced by inequity (Conlon and Murray 1996; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1998) . Social psychologists believe that provision of an explanation for a negative event can help restore equity and influence one's evaluation of the event (Utne and Kidd 1980) . For example, explaining why imposing a penalty is necessary will help customers understand the rationale for the penalty and, therefore, feel less distressed. However, some view that adequacy of justification (i.e., whether the claim was adequate) is more important than the causal account itself in affecting one's cognitive evaluation of the event (Bies and Shapiro 1987) . In other words, an explanation itself will have little positive effect on customer responses, but the perception that the explanation is adequate will enhance cognitive evaluations (e.g., perceived fairness) to a greater extent. Thus, adequacy of the explanation offered for the penalty is expected to (positively) affect customers' responses to penalty incidents (Bies and Shapiro 1987; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) .
In sum, we expect three attributes of service organizations'penalties to influence customer responses, such that 
The Effects of Attributions
Attribution theory accounts for how people make causal inferences, and previous studies show that inferred reasons for events influence customer responses and satisfaction judgments (Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters 1993; Dubé and Menon 2000; Folkes 1984; Heider 1958; Jones and Davis 1965; Kelley 1973) . Attribution theory can be helpful in explaining customers'responses to penalties because research shows that negative events (e.g., punitive actions) elicit more attributional search and longer survey of causal information than positive or neutral events (e.g., success, reward) (Peeters and Czapinski 1990; Wong and Weiner 1981) .
Locus of causality. Attribution research shows that locus of causality (internal [e.g., personality] vs. external [e.g., weather]) influences one's judgment of the incident under consideration (Bradley 1978; Heider 1958) . This means that customers who attribute the penalty to internal factors (themselves) are more likely to feel responsible for the penalty than those who attribute the causes to external factors. This internal attribution will contribute to lowering customers'negative evaluations of the penalty because they are predisposed to accept it.
Stability. In addition to locus, stability is another dimension of attributions that refers to the likelihood that the same incident will occur again in the future. Previous studies have found that customers' responses to service recovery efforts differ depending on perceived stability of the problem (Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters 1993; Folkes 1984) . For example, Folkes (1984) found that customers preferred refunds to exchanges when they perceived that the problems were stable. Similarly, we would expect customers'evaluations of penalties to differ depending on stability of the cause. Based on previous research, when customers perceive the cause of the penalty to be stable (i.e., likely to occur again), they are likely to judge the penalty more negatively than when they do not because of the prospect that negative outcomes (i.e., penalties) will occur again. The expectation that negative situations are likely to recur may make customers be highly involved in the situation and make rigorous judgments. Thus, customers' responses to penalties will be influenced by whether the customer perceives the cause to be stable. Thus, we propose that attributions of stability (i.e., likelihood of occurring again) will be negatively related to customers' responses to service organizations' penalties.
However, penalty situations differ from other types of service conflict situations (e.g., service failure) in that customers, not the service organizations, are the ones who trigger the negative incident (penalty) or "perpetrate the crime." This unique context may cause stability attributions to behave somewhat differently when modeling customers' evaluations. Previous studies that examined service failure and recovery episodes defined stability as the likelihood that the service organization will fail the customer again (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999) . However, in penalty situations, stability is characterized in terms of the likelihood that the customer will fail the service organization again (by repeating the same behavior that violates the organizations' policies and results in a penalty). In other words, customers determine the stability of the cause by engaging in either undesirable behaviors (e.g., late return of equipment) or desirable behaviors (e.g., timely return) in the future. Thus, even if customers perceive that the penalty will be stable (i.e., recur), this may not lead to negative evaluations of the firm because they "chose" to incur the penalty again (decided to be a "repeat offender"). Therefore, considering the uniqueness of penalty situations, it may be possible that attributions of stability (i.e., likelihood of occurring again) could have a positive effect on customers' justice evaluations and other assessments of service organizations' penalties.
Controllability.
A third dimension of attributions is controllability (or volitional control), which is related to whether one had control over the cause that led to the outcome. Prior research shows that when people have volitional control over the cause, they are more likely to take responsibility for the outcome than when they do not (Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters 1993; McCarthy and Fram 2000) . For example, McCarthy and Fram (2000) found that perceived fairness with respect to penalties increased when customers felt that the situation was under their own control (e.g., "late cancellation" and "extended vacation"). Prior research also suggests that customers exhibit lenient evaluations toward an organization when the cause of the negative consequence was beyond the control of the organization (Blodgett, Granbois, and Walters 1993; Folkes 1984) . Likewise, we expect that customers' evaluations of penalties will be dependent on whether the customers had control over the situation such that their responses to the penalty are more positive when they perceived that the cause of the penalty was under their control.
In sum, based on principles of attribution theory, we make the following predictions about the effects of attributions on customers' responses to penalties assessed by service organizations:
Hypothesis 2a: External attributions of locus will have a negative influence on perceived justice and positive disconfirmation and a positive influence on negative emotion. Hypothesis 2b: Attributions of stability will have a negative influence on perceived justice and positive disconfirmation and a positive influence on negative emotion. Hypothesis 2c: Attributions of controllability will have a positive influence on perceived justice and positive disconfirmation and a negative influence on negative emotion.
The Effects of Cognitive and Affective Responses on Dissatisfaction Judgments
Prior research shows that transaction-based satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgments (e.g., dissatisfaction with a penalty incident) are influenced by customers' cognitive evaluations (e.g., perceptions of justice, expectancy disconfirmation) and affective responses (e.g., emotion) to a particular encounter or event (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999) . In this study, we consider the effects of justice perceptions (i.e., distributive, procedural, and interactional justice), expectancy disconfirmation, and (negative) emotion on customers' dissatisfaction with penalty incidents.
Perceived justice. Social justice theory views social interaction as reciprocal exchange, governed by a norm of justice (Adams 1965 ). The theory is based on a notion of social exchange in which individuals seek to maximize outcomes and minimize inputs. When a person perceives that he or she is not being treated fairly, this person feels distressed and seeks restoration. The assessment of how equitable or fair the exchange is depends on one party's view of the value and relevance of the exchange partners' inputs and outcomes (Adams 1965) . Traditional theories of justice view equity as one's ratio of outcomes to inputs relative to his or her partner's outcome/input ratio (Adams 1965; Homans 1961) . Inputs are contributions to the exchange, whereas outcomes are defined as positive or negative consequences that occur as a result of the exchange with the partner. Inequity exists when one perceives that his or her output/input ratio is unequal to his or her referent's ratio (Adams 1965) . Given that penalties are generally triggered due to customers' failures rather than the organization's failures, customers' perceptions of justice involving a penalty will be based on the comparison between harm caused to the organization by the customer's behavior (e.g., late return) and harm caused to the customer by the organization (e.g., penalty-deprivation of an economic resource). Berry (1995) suggests that every policy and strategy should be subjected to a "fairness test" to ensure that they are aligned with the organization's relationship-building efforts. Borrowing concepts from social psychology and organizational behavior, the marketing literature suggests that individuals who are involved in conflicts or disputes should base their evaluations of the organization on perceptions of justice (McCarthy and Fram 2000; Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) . For example, Smith, Bolton, and Wagner (1999) found that perceived justice is central to customers' evaluations of the service organization's service recovery efforts following service failures. Penalties often instigate conflicts between customers and organizations; therefore, we expect that customers' evaluations of penalty incidents will be influenced by perceptions of justice.
Social justice theory has evolved to include three types of perceived justice: distributive, procedural, and interactional. Distributive justice is concerned with distribution of resources, which affects individual well-being (Adams 1965; Homans 1961; Deutsch 1975) . Procedural justice involves perceived fairness of the process through which the outcome was reached or resources were distributed (Thibaut and Walker 1975) . Interactional justice reflects the interpersonal dimension of fairness and represents the interactional style used to communicate outcomes (Bies and Moag 1986) . All three types of justice are considered relevant to penalty situations because customers will evaluate not only fairness regarding the penalty amount (i.e., distributive justice) but also fairness concerning policies and procedures (i.e., procedural justice) and personal interactions and communications (i.e., interactional justice) used to deliver the penalty. Even though some studies (Welbourne 1998) show that one type of perceived justice may have a larger effect than others depending on the circumstances, previous research consistently supports the notion that models of satisfaction/ dissatisfaction are enhanced when all three types of justice are included (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) . Thus, this study considers three types of perceived justice such that Hypothesis 3a: Perceptions of distributive justice will be negatively related to customers' dissatisfaction with penalty incidents. Hypothesis 3b: Perceptions of procedural justice will be negatively related to customers' dissatisfaction with penalty incidents. Hypothesis 3c: Perceptions of interactional justice will be negatively related to customers' dissatisfaction with penalty incidents.
Disconfirmation. Disconfirmation is a cognitive evaluation process whereby a customer compares a service organization's performance to his or her prior expectations. Positive disconfirmation occurs when performance ex-ceeds expectations, whereas negative disconfirmation occurs when performance does not meet expectations. Previous studies suggest that disconfirmation has a significant influence on customers' satisfaction judgments (Oliver 1980) . Even though the role of disconfirmation in satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgments has been established in prior research related to service failure and recovery incidents, it has not been explored in the context of penalty situations, especially in a comprehensive model that also includes perceived justice and emotion (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999) . Some researchers have suggested that the effect of disconfirmation on satisfaction judgments may be weakened when customers' expectations are ill formed (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999) . Because service organizations are often found to eschew effective communications about "negative" subjects such as penalties, customers may not have specific or wellformed expectations, causing the influence of disconfirmation to be overshadowed by the effects of other types of cognitive and affective evaluations in the formation of customers' satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgments about penalty incidents. Nevertheless, we expect positive (negative) disconfirmation to have a negative (positive) influence on dissatisfaction such that Hypothesis 4: Positive disconfirmation will be negatively related to customers' dissatisfaction with penalty incidents.
Emotion. Services marketing researchers have recently begun to more carefully examine the role of emotion in satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgments and have suggested that emotional responses have a distinct and separate influence on satisfaction/dissatisfaction (even after controlling for disconfirmation) and that including emotion in models of satisfaction increases the amount of variance explained (Alford and Sherrell 1996; Andreassen 2000; Dubé 1990; Liljander and Strandvik 1997; Smith and Bolton 2002; Wirtz and Bateson 1999) . Previous studies differentiate emotion from affect and define affect as a broad mental state that includes specific mental processes such as emotion and mood, whereas emotion is defined as a mental state resulting from cognitive processing of events or thoughts and that has a specific referent (Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer 1999) . In this study, we investigate the influence of emotion arising from the customer's experience of a penalty assessed by a service organization. Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer (1999, p. 200 ) have observed that emotions often function in broad categories or "amalgamated groupings" of positive and negative emotion. Because penalties are undesirable for customers, we consider the effects of negative emotion on their level of dissatisfaction after accounting for the effects of cognitive antecedents (i.e., perceived justice, disconfirmation) such that Hypothesis 5: Negative emotion will be positively related to customers' dissatisfaction with penalty incidents.
The Mediating Role of Cognitive and Affective Evaluations
Prior research suggests that the influences of penalty attributes and attributions on dissatisfaction judgments may be mediated by customers'responses to penalties. For example, in the context of organizations' service failure and recovery efforts, Smith, Bolton, and Wagner (1999) showed that the direct effects of service recovery attributes on customer satisfaction became minimal when the effects of customers' cognitive evaluations of the service failure (e.g., perceptions of justice) were controlled. In other words, customers' cognitive evaluations of the incident may mediate the relationship between the antecedents of the evaluations and dissatisfaction judgments. Therefore, we perform a mediation test on our model to determine whether customers' cognitive (i.e., perceived justice, positive disconfirmation) and affective evaluations (i.e., negative emotion) mediate the relationship between their antecedents (i.e., penalty attributes and attributions) and dissatisfaction judgments of penalty incidents.
Overall, this study integrates concepts from the attribution, social justice, expectancy disconfirmation, emotion, and satisfaction/dissatisfaction literatures to offer a comprehensive model of customers' responses to service organizations' penalties.
RESEARCH METHOD Sampling Frame and Data Collection Method
The sample for the study consisted of e-mail subscribers to two groups. The first group is an organization that manages the listserv that includes approximately 10,000 subscribers to a swing dance e-mail list. The second group is an MBA program of a university in the northeast region of the United States that regularly communicates to its members (about 250) via e-mail. The two organizations distributed e-mail announcements about the study. The subscribers were informed in the e-mail that, as an incentive to participate in the study, they would be entered into a prize drawing upon completing the Web-based survey (prizes were two pairs of dance shoes valued at $100 each for the dance group and a $100 book store gift certificate for the MBA student group). The survey employed a crosssectional design, and the critical incident technique was used to collect the data. The critical incident technique is a systematic way of observing critical incidents that led to a positive or negative consequence (Bitner, Booms, and Tetreault 1990; Edvardsson and Roos 2001; Roos, Edvardsson, and Gustafsson 2004) . Respondents were asked to recall a recent penalty incident (within the past year), describe the situation in their own words, and complete a battery of structured questions based on the identified incident.
The total number of responses was 215. Fourteen responses were omitted due to missing data. Therefore, the final sample used in the analysis included 201 observations. Because of the low response rate and concerns about potential nonresponse bias, the following test was conducted to test for nonresponse bias. Early respondents were compared to late respondents on several key variables (e.g., demographic variables, perceptions of justice, emotion, dissatisfaction). The premise of this testing method is that early respondents represent the average respondent, whereas late respondents represent the average nonrespondent (Lambert and Harrington 1990) . The results of the t tests comparing the means between the two groups reveal that there is no significant difference between the two groups, providing evidence that nonresponse bias should not be a threat to the validity of the study's results.
The respondents were asked to complete the survey as a customer of the service organization that they chose in order to include a variety of penalty cases across the industries. To ensure that these two respondent groups could be pooled together for model estimation, the means of several key variables (e.g., attributions, perceived justice, and dissatisfaction) and demographic variables were compared. The t test results showed no significant differences (p > .05) between the two groups on those variables, nor were there significant differences in the variances between groups (Levene's test for equality of variances), suggesting that the samples could be pooled.
Of the final sample of 201 customers, 32% were male, and the average age was 35. The penalty amount ranged between $2 (cancellation of satellite services) and $450 (cancellation of airline tickets). The most common types of penalties were late payment fees most common in the credit card industry, cancellation/no-show fees, and overdraft fees, representing 47%, 21%, and 14% of the penalty incidents, respectively.
Measure Development and Model Variables
The measures used for the model variables in this study are shown in Table 1 . Items were generated for each construct based on the scales used in previous studies. All constructs were measured with multiple items using 7-point scales, except locus of causality (which was a classification question). Severity of penalty was measured by asking respondents to indicate the severity level of the penalty on a five-item semantic differential scale adapted from Antia and Frazier (2001) . Flexibility was measured by asking respondents to indicate the level of flexibility that the company showed in dealing with the penalty on a three-item semantic differential scale. Adequacy of the explanation on the penalty was measured by asking respondents to indicate the level of adequacy of the explanation that the organization provided for the penalty using a fouritem semantic differential scale. The scales for flexibility and adequacy of explanation were both adapted from previous studies (Bies and Shapiro 1987; Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999; Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) .
The items used to measure attributions were adapted from the studies of Folkes, Koletsky, and Graham (1987) ; Dubé and Menon (2000) ; and Smith, Bolton, and Wagner (1999) . Locus of causality was measured by asking respondents to make attributions of the cause of the penalty: internal or external. Stability was measured with two items involving the likelihood of a similar penalty situation occurring again. Controllability was measured with two items by asking respondents to evaluate their perceived controllability over the situation that led to the penalty.
The measures of perceived justice were adapted from the studies of Smith, Bolton, and Wagner (1999) and Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran (1998) . The multiple items used for perceived justice were anchored by strongly disagree and strongly agree on a 7-point scale. The measures of disconfirmation were adapted from Oliver (1980) and Prakash (1984) . The items were anchored by much worse than expected and much better than expected. The items of emotion were adapted from Liljander and Strandvik (1997 ), Oliver (1993 ), and Richins (1997 . Emotion was measured with items anchored by very little and very much. Dissatisfaction with the penalty was measured with items adapted from Babin and Griffin (1998) , Bitner and Hubbert (1994) , and Oliver and Swan (1989) . The items were anchored by not at all dissatisfied and very dissatisfied.
A series of three pretests was performed to improve the questionnaire design by detecting and fixing any problems related to the flow of the questionnaire and the wording, phrasing, and interpretation of questions, as well as to ensure the viability of the survey delivery method. The survey was pretested with a convenience sample of 9 participants using the concurrent "think-aloud" pretest method (Bolton 1993; Bolton and Bronkhorst 1990) , a sample of 70 undergraduate students using the pencil-and-paper survey method, and a sample of 8 respondents using the online survey method.
The measures used in the survey were subjected to reliability and validity analyses. Reliabilities were assessed using Cronbach's alpha coefficients, which ranged from 0.71 to 0.95. Coefficients exceeding 0.70 are considered acceptable (Nunnally 1978) . The items were then subjected to validity analysis. Principal components analysis with varimax rotation was performed to determine whether the items measuring each construct loaded properly on the hypothesized factors. Some items with low factor loadings and high cross-loadings were eliminated sequentially using an iterative process to enhance convergent and discriminant validity. For example, one item each from the scales measuring disconfirmation, procedural justice, interactional justice, and dissatisfaction was eliminated through the process. It should be noted that the use of measurement items pruned based on their performance in the research sample rather than a pretest sample is one of the limitations of the study. Table 1 shows the final scale items used for model estimation, along with Cronbach's alpha coefficients and factor loadings. In addition to the results of the principal components analysis, a correlation matrix was obtained to examine the correlation coefficients against the associated reliabilities. The result showed evidence of discriminant validity because none of the correlations between any two scales was higher than the reliabilities of the scales (Churchill 1979) . Table 2 shows the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for the model variables. We also conducted confirmatory factor analysis on each pair of primary measures to examine whether the model constraining the measures to be the same is significantly different from the unconstrained model. If the chi-square differences are significant, evidence of discriminant validity is indicated (Rust, Moorman, and Dickson 2002) . Table 3 shows the results that demonstrate evidence of discriminant validity among the constructs.
Control Variables
Before estimating the model, we systematically tested a series of potential control variables to help rule out alternative explanations for our results. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and nested-model F tests, we checked each of the individual equations in the system for significant effects of demographic variables (including age, gender, income, and education), penalty amount, familiarity with the organization's penalty policies, and frequency of being penalized by organizations in general (i.e., "penalty proneness"). Based on the results of these tests, we retained only those control variables that were significant at p ≤ .05. This procedure helped us to eliminate unnecessary control variables and to preserve the parsimony of the model. Two of the four demographic variables (age and income) as well as familiarity with the penalty (an index of two items-"how knowledgeable were you about the penalty policy?" and "how familiar were you with the penalty policy?") were the only potential control variables that met the criteria for inclusion in the model equations. To control for these effects, familiarity was included in the equations for disconfirmation and emotion, age was included in the equations for interactional and procedural justice, and income was included in the equation for dissatisfaction. Therefore, our model accounts for individual differences in responses based on demographic characteristics and on customers' level of familiarity with the organization's penalty policies at the time the penalty was imposed.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
To estimate the model, we created a composite index for each construct by computing the average of the items. This method was adopted based on the evidence of reliabilities and validity of the measures. To test the study's hypotheses, we estimated the comprehensive model shown in Figure 1 with two-stage least squares (2SLS).
The results of the model estimation are presented in Table 4. The R 2 values of the equations for the cognitive and affective antecedents range from 0.39 to 0.65, and the R 2 value for the dissatisfaction equation is 0.62, suggesting that a large portion of the variance in each of the dependent variables is explained by the associated predictor variables.
Effects of Penalty Attributes and Attributions
Hypotheses 1a through 1c predict that penalty attributes will influence customer responses to penalties. The results show that severity of penalty and adequacy of explanation both have significant influences on distributive justice, disconfirmation, and negative emotion (p < .05). Also, adequacy of explanation has a positive influence on perceptions of interactional justice. Flexibility is shown to have a significant influence on perceptions of all three types of justice as well as disconfirmation but no significant impact on negative emotion. All relationships are in the expected directions.
Hypotheses 2a through 2c posit that attributions will affect customers'responses to penalties. The test results provide only partial support for Hypothesis 2. Controllability is shown to have a significant positive influence on all three types of justice. Stability also had significant effects on interactional justice and disconfirmation, but these effects were positive, failing to support the proposed hypothesis. Locus of causality was not a significant predictor in any of the equations at p < .05.
To check for potential interaction effects both within and among penalty attributes and attributions (e.g., Locus × Stability, Severity × Flexibility, Locus × Severity, etc.) as well as interaction effects between penalty attributes and attributions and the cognitive and affective antecedents (e.g., Locus × Distributive Justice, Flexibility × Disconfirmation, etc.), a series of nested-model joint F tests was conducted in which full and reduced models (the original models vs. models that included groups of interaction effects) were compared for each of the model equations. The overall results showed that, in each equation, the addition of interaction effects did not significantly contribute to the explained variance. Thus, the original models (without interaction effects) were retained for this study.
Mediating Role of Cognitive and Affective Responses
A mediation test suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) was used to examine whether cognitive and affective evaluations (perceived justice, disconfirmation, and emotion) mediate the relationship between their antecedents (i.e., To check for potential interaction effects between the three types of justice as evidenced in previous studies (Tax, Brown, and Chandrashekaran 1998) , we conducted nested-model F tests. In these tests, the full model with interaction terms (e.g., Distributive Justice × Interactional Justice) was compared against a model without interaction terms. The test result suggested that the final model should include the effects of interactions between the three types of justice as they significantly increase the portion of the variance explained in the dependent variable. Aiken and West (1996) suggest that using mean-centered data in regressions with interaction terms may eliminate or reduce multicollinearity effects. Thus, we mean-centered certain variables (only those variables whose interaction terms were included in the regression analysis were meancentered-i.e., distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice) by subtracting the mean of the variable from each case. Then, regression for the second stage (i.e., using predicted values) was run using the meancentered variables (i.e., mean-centered predicted values of distributive justice, procedural justice, interactional justice), their interaction terms, and other predictor variables that did not need to be mean-centered (i.e., disconfirmation, emotion). The model estimation results are reported in Table 4 .
Customers' Dissatisfaction With Penalty Incidents
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 predict that customers' dissatisfaction judgments regarding penalty situations will be influenced by perceived justice, positive disconfirmation, and negative emotion, respectively. The results presented in Table 4 indicate that distributive justice and negative emotion significantly affect customers' dissatisfaction judgments about penalties (p < .05), in support of Hypotheses 3a and 5. The results also show that disconfirmation does not play a significant role in determining dissatisfaction with penalties when the effects of perceived justice and emotion are controlled for. However, although Hypothesis 4 was not supported, this finding is consistent with previous studies that support the strong role of emotion in situations where customers have not formed specific expectations (Alford and Sherrell 1996) and in service encounters involving failure and recovery (Smith and Bolton 2002) . It should be noted that there is a significant effect of interaction between distributive justice and interactional justice on customers' dissatisfaction judgments, suggesting the evidence of a dynamic relationship between the perceptions of justice and dissatisfaction. Also, one control variable-household income-has a significant effect on customers' dissatisfaction judgments about penalty situations.
Given that familiarity with the penalty policy had a significant effect on customers' disconfirmation evaluations and emotion levels, raising the possibility that the dissatisfaction model may operate differently for customers who had more versus less knowledge about the organization's penalty policy (e.g., "I knew the rule and the penalty was not unexpected; thus, I am not dissatisfied" vs. "I didn't know about the penalty policy, and therefore I am surprised and upset"), a post hoc subgroup analysis using a Chow (1960) test was performed to compare the two groups (one with a lower level of familiarity/knowledge and another with a higher level of familiarity/knowledge) based on the overall model equation for dissatisfaction. The results showed no significant differences in the pattern of regression coefficients between the two groups, supporting the model's applicability across customers, regardless of the level of prior knowledge/familiarity with the organization's penalty policy.
DISCUSSION
As one of the few empirical studies investigating customers' evaluations of penalties, this research examined the roles of penalty attributes and attributions in customer responses, as well as the effects of cognitive and affective responses on dissatisfaction.
The first objective of this study was to examine the impact of penalty attributes on customer responses. Penalty attributes are found to have significant effects on the cognitive and affective antecedents of dissatisfaction. The results show that severity is a significant driver of distributive justice, disconfirmation, and negative emotion, with 70% of the explained variance in emotion attributed to severity of the penalty. Flexibility has the largest effect on procedural justice (76% of the explained variance) but also has a substantial influence on interactional justice (33%), disconfirmation (30%), and distributive justice (11%). Adequacy of explanation for penalties accounts for a large portion of the variance in distributive justice (41%), interactional justice (48%), disconfirmation (28%), and emotion (14%). Overall, these findings show that various penalty attributes influence customers' responses and that these penalty attributes carry different weights in terms of their influence on customers' justice perceptions, positive disconfirmation, and negative emotions. .000
.000
NOTE: Standardized coefficients are reported. (R) denotes the sign of the coefficient reversed from what was expected.^denotes the predicted value of the variable. For definitions of variables, see Table 1 . LO-CUS is dummy coded, where 0 represents internal factors and 1 represents external factors. Explained variance shows the relative importance of predictor variables in the form of a percentage of total explained variance. Total explained variance for each equation was obtained by summing the squared betas (standardized coefficients). Explained variance attributable to each predictor variable was then calculated by dividing the squared beta by the total explained variance. Values may not sum exactly to 100% due to rounding. The results exhibit evidence of multicollinearity (high variance inflation factor values [> 5] for some variables in the equation of dissatisfaction-e.g., distributive justice, disconfirmation, and emotion in the equation of dissatisfaction-therefore, the results should be interpreted with caution).
The second objective of the study was to examine the role of attributions in customer responses to penalties. The findings show that two types of attributions-controllability and stability-have a significant direct influence on the cognitive and affective antecedents of dissatisfaction. Attributions of controllability have a significant effect on all three types of perceived justice. Consistent with the attribution literature, we found that customers' perceptions of justice are higher when they perceive they had more control over the penalty situation. Stability is shown to have a significant impact on interactional justice and positive disconfirmation, but the direction of the relationships is opposite from what was expected in Hypothesis 2b. This interesting finding might be explained by the situational context of the penalty incident. The services marketing literature demonstrates that stability of the cause for a negative incident (e.g., service failure) is likely to increase customer dissatisfaction. It is understandable that customers who experience service failures become aggravated by perceived stability of the cause because of the prospect that the same negative incident could occur again. However, in penalty situations, customers, not the service organizations, are the ones who "perpetrate the crime" or trigger the negative incident (i.e., penalty). Thus, when customers are subjected to a penalty as a result of their choice decisions (e.g., as one respondent explained, "I don't mind paying a $3 late fee, and I will probably return the videotape late again"), they may be inclined to accept the penalties and feel less distressed.
To further investigate possible explanations for the reverse sign for the effect of stability attributions on cognitive and affective responses, we conducted post hoc analyses of mean differences. The respondents were divided into two groups based on their perceptions of stability (low vs. high), and the means of the two groups on several individual difference variables were compared. The t test results show that the two stability groups significantly differ in terms of their familiarity with and knowledge of the organizations' penalty policies and in terms of their frequency of receiving penalties from service organizations. The high-stability attribution group (i.e., those customers who believe that a similar penalty incident is likely to occur again) has a significantly higher level of familiarity with and frequency of penalties than the lowstability group. This suggests that "penalty-prone" customers (i.e., those who are very familiar with penalty policies and are frequently penalized) are more likely to believe that "history will repeat itself" in that they are likely to have penalties assessed on them in the future. Because they expect this penalty pattern to continue, they may be more willing to accept the penalties and evaluate the penalty more positively (i.e., less negatively) than those who are not familiar with the organization's penalty policies and are not used to having penalties imposed on them.
In the model equations, attributions of locus did not have a significant direct effect on customers' responses to penalty incidents, despite the fact that in a post hoc analysis of mean differences between locus attribution groups (internal vs. external cause), the responses of customers who attributed the cause of the penalty to external factors were significantly more negative than the responses of those who attributed the cause to internal factors (i.e., themselves).
The third research objective was to examine the influences of cognitive and affective responses on customer dissatisfaction with penalties. This study found that perceptions of justice (distributive justice and interaction between distributive justice and interactional justice) are an important determinant of dissatisfaction judgments. This is not surprising given that penalties are costly for customers, and they base their evaluations of the incident on perceived justice in such situations. The significant role of emotion in satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgments has been well reported (Dubé, Belanger, and Trudeau 1996; Dubé and Menon 2000; Oliver 1993; Smith and Bolton 2002; Weiner 1985) . Consistent with previous research, this study shows that negative emotions displayed over the (penalty) incident explain a larger portion of the variance in dissatisfaction than disconfirmation does (Alford and Sherrell 1996; Dubé 1990) . Strong effects of emotional responses on dissatisfaction judgments may ensue because penalties, which cause customers to lose economic resources, are likely to engage customers in the incident emotionally.
The satisfaction/dissatisfaction literature shows that disconfirmation is a primary factor in explaining customers' satisfaction/dissatisfaction judgments. However, this study has found that in the context of penalty incidents, justice (accounting for 32% of the explained variance) and emotion (accounting for 27% of the explained variance) play more important roles in determining customer dissatisfaction, as shown in Table 4 . As Oliver and Swan (1989) have suggested, disconfirmation may be central to the product satisfaction process, in which customers evaluate performance of the products against their expectations. But the role of disconfirmation may become weak when customers evaluate the objects about which they have not formed specific expectations. Although organizations put forth great effort to communicate to customers about products, they typically do not proactively promote their penalty policies. This lack of communication is likely to contribute to customers' poorly defined expectations about penalties. This may have led to the relatively weak role of disconfirmation in customer dissatisfaction with penalties and is consistent with findings by Smith, Bolton, and Wagner (1999) with regard to customers'expectations about organizations' service recovery efforts.
Finally, the study's findings suggest that the incremental effects of different types of justice on dissatisfaction differ based on other types of perceived justice. For example, the incremental impact of interactional justice on dissatisfaction is smaller in the presence of perceived distributive justice than in the absence of perceived distributive justice. This finding suggests that the three different types of perceived justice are interrelated and complementary to each other and that service organizations should try to enhance all three dimensions of justice when handling penalties and include the measures of all three dimensions when examining dissatisfaction with penalty incidents.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Service organizations often impose penalties on customers without fully understanding the potential effects and consequences. Customers who have had highly dissatisfactory penalty experiences may terminate their relationship with the service organization without ever raising their concerns to its representatives-though they may choose to voice their displeasure to others. Furthermore, customers who decide to remain with the organization after a penalty incident may become more susceptible to appealing offers or incentives offered by other service organizations. Yet few service organizations make an effort to systematically investigate or effectively manage the fallout that may result from penalties. This research provides service managers with information helpful to manage penalties effectively.
Manage Penalties Relative to the "Crime" Committed
Our study shows that three types of penalty attributes influence customers' evaluations of penalties. This suggests that not only the severity of the penalty but also the way the penalty is administered and handled is critical to customers' evaluations of the penalty incident. The results of the study show that penalty attributes have differential impacts on customers' responses. Consistent with previous research by Smith, Bolton, and Wagner (1999) , who show that customers prefer to receive recovery efforts that "match" the type of failure they experience, this study suggests that certain penalty attributes might be matched with various types of customer evaluations for maximum impact. For instance, our results demonstrate that severity of penalty has the most impact on distributive justice, whereas flexibility has the largest effect on procedural justice, and adequacy of an explanation has the greatest impact on interactional justice. These findings suggest that to increase customers' perceptions of distributive justice and decrease their negative emotions-the responses that have the most impact on dissatisfaction following a penalty incident-establishment of an appropriate penalty relative to the "crime" committed (i.e., severity of penalty, which accounts for 41% of the explained variances in distributive justice and 70% of the explained variance in negative emotion) and effective communication about penalties to customers (i.e., adequacy of explanation, which accounts for 41% of the explained variance in distributive justice and 14% of the explained variance in negative emotion) are very important. The following excerpt from a survey respondent shows the importance of effective communication:
It was explained to me that the money would be debited straight out of my account each time I use the debit card. I was under the impression that a vendor would know immediately if, after entering a purchase into the computer, that the amount would be denied if the account did not have adequate funds. I find out later that the bank will approve up to $400 extra past your balance in order for the check to not bounce. This was all contained in the fine print that I supposedly had read and understood. . . . I was very angry because I felt that the representative that set up this account did not explain this feature adequately.
Consider Causal Factors and Customize Penalties
Second, the study supports that customers make causal accounts for penalty incidents, and customers'perceptions of controllability over the situation have a positive influence on perceptions of justice. Customers' perceptions of fairness are higher when they perceive the causes that led to the penalty were controllable. For example, customers will perceive the organization's penalty as less fair when the cause is attributed to a delayed mail delivery system or the organization's error (i.e., uncontrollable) than when it is attributed to their own behaviors (i.e., controllable-"I forgot," "I mailed the payment late," etc.). This means that service organizations may want to identify and categorize different types of penalty causes. The categorization of penalties may be helpful in enhancing customer service (e.g., differential treatments based on the penalty categories) and empowering service employees to "customize" the handling of penalty situations. For example, a service organization may want to develop a list of penalty cases, under which penalties can be waived or reduced at the discretion of a front-line service employee. For instance, the following excerpt from one survey respondent shows how customers feel about penalties that occur beyond their control:
I mailed the payment on time, but it arrived one day late. I was charged a late fee of $55. My loan payment amount was $199, and I just paid a lump sum of $7,000. I thought it was unfair they charged me a late fee when it was apparent that I had paid off a substantial amount on my loan. I had the funds and paid a good portion of the $10,000 originally borrowed. I believe it should have been waived. I called the company and they wouldn't reverse the late fee. I have since paid off the loan and refuse to talk to them when they call me on the phone. I will never do business with them again.
Another way of enhancing customer evaluations with respect to controllability is to offer customers programs that help lower the likelihood of being exposed to an unpredictable situation. Some banks offer an overdraft protection program that allows customers to avoid overdraft penalties by participating in the program. Automatic payment services that allow funds to be transferred automatically at prespecified times may help customers avoid penalty incidents. Also, in some industries (e.g., travel), options to buy an insurance policy are offered to customers so that modifying the original purchase agreement (e.g., rescheduling) due to an unpredictable or uncontrollable factor is not a huge burden to them.
Some service organizations already customize their penalty policies as part of customer tiering/stratification programs (e.g., banks may refrain from imposing penalties for bounced checks on their best customers, etc.; Business Week, October 23, 2000, pp. 118-28) . In other situations, customization of penalty policies can help both the customers and the service organization. For instance, one survey respondent reported that when he switched to another wireless phone service company, his former provider continued to mail out statements to collect a nominal late fee (e.g., $0.34) that occurred in association with his final bill settlement. This type of inefficient activity (which is not in the economic interest of the company and caused bad will with a former customer) could be prevented if the organization had a penalty system that identifies fees that should be waived.
One of the interesting findings regarding the influence of attributions on customers' evaluations of penalties was that stability (i.e., likelihood that a similar incident would occur again) has a positive influence on customers'evaluations (perceptions of justice and positive disconfirmation). This may be because customers who are "penalty prone" (i.e., those who expect to receive penalties on a somewhat regular basis) are more likely to accept the penalty and less likely to have negative feelings about the penalty. For instance, one survey respondent acknowledges that customers are often resigned to service organizations' frequent use of penalties and have to make decisions about which penalties they are willing to accept: I was annoyed by the fee; however I had a choice to either pay the $10 phone payment fee or a higher one of $29 for sending it via mail late. The fact that I wasn't overly appalled is perhaps more frightening that we are conditioned to expect these extraneous fees as a fact of modern life.
It seems that penalty-prone customers (i.e., "repeat offenders") have different attitudes toward penalties than first-time offenders. Although repeat offenders are likely to be more tolerant of penalties, first-time offenders who have kept a good record (i.e., crime free) are less likely to be tolerant of penalties and expect a lenient penalty resolution from the service organization upon a penalty dispute. One survey respondent noted, "I have always made timely payments and have never been late with a payment-they should have considered this fact and waived the fee." Thus, service organizations should take into account customers' "criminal record" (i.e., penalty history) in dealing with penalties and offer them differential treatments based on their past behavior.
Focus on Fairness and Manage Emotions During Penalty Situations
The results of this study show that customers base evaluations of penalty incidents heavily on justice. Given that perceived justice has a significant influence on dissatisfaction judgments, service organizations should strive to identify penalties that are considered fair by customers. According to equity theory, fairness is established by one's output/input ratio relative to one's partner's output/ input ratio. Therefore, to determine fair penalties, service organizations should take into account both customers' perceived harm caused to them due to the penalty and perceived harm caused to the organization due to their behaviors (e.g., the fee for the late return of a 5-day videotape by 3 days should not exceed the opportunity cost that the retailer incurred by not being able to rent it out for the 3 days). The following excerpts from survey respondents highlight the importance of fairness in terms of penalty amounts.
I thought this particular penalty [credit card late payment fee] was excessive. You are already paying high interest; the penalty should have been more in line with the payment. The penalty was more than the payment!! I deposited a check in the amount of $1,000 to my checking account. After that I wrote four checks to pay some bills. The amount stated on these four checks was very little, ranging from $8 to $20. Unfortunately, the check I deposited was returned because the person that paid did not have enough funds in his account. Therefore all of my four checks were bounced back, and I had to pay 4 × $21 overdraft penalty fee.
Also, the findings of the study suggest that establishing justice not only through fair penalty amounts but also through the procedures used to handle penalties and interactional manners used by employees is important in lowering customer dissatisfaction with penalty incidents. For example, service organizations can change customers' negative perceptions toward a penalty by offering an adequate explanation of the penalty and providing justification. In this sense, service organizations' effective communication with customers is vital to reducing customer dissatisfaction and managing penalties. The organization's clear and effective communications about penalty policies and procedures will help customers maintain reasonable expectations and help them avoid penalties in the first place. One survey respondent made the following remark, which demonstrates the importance of effective communication about penalties:
The teller never informed me about this penalty fee when I opened my account there. I feel that there are so many hidden fees in this society that the only way to know if there are any fees is to ask every single person, every single minute, every step of the way! The study also shows that emotion plays an important role in dissatisfaction judgments. The more negative emotion customers feel, the worse their evaluations of the penalty will be. In our study, customers' open-ended responses to a question about how the penalty incident made them feel produced descriptors ranging from "annoyed," "frustrated," and "upset" to "angry," "furious," and "cheated." Thus, service employees should be trained to handle customers who express their negative feelings. However, few service organizations make a systematic effort to educate their front-line employees about how to effectively identify and handle distressed customers and engage in emotional labor (Dube and Menon 1998, 2000) . Service organizations should offer customized responses based on the magnitude of (negative) emotion that customers express. For instance, offers of an adequate explanation and justification for the penalty may not be sufficient to resolve disputes involving customers whose anger has reached a high level. Appropriate treatment of these customers may require an extra offer (e.g., reduced annual percentage rate for credit card holders). For other customers, a simple explanation of why imposing a penalty was necessary (e.g., to recover costs caused to the firm by the customers'actions) may be enough to diffuse their anger.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
Future studies may enhance the model by developing and including a typology of penalties. In efforts to construct a classification scheme for penalties, various types of penalties could be examined and categorized based on certain shared attributes. For example, penalties may be classified into two groups based on the following attribute: penalties that involve extended benefits (e.g., latereturn fees associated with a late return of a DVD moviecustomers get to hold the DVD for a few more days) and penalties that do not involve extended benefits for customers (e.g., restocking fees). Another way to enhance the model may involve inclusion of other potentially relevant variables such as self-efficacy or customers' perceptions of the organization's penalty intentionality.
One of limitations of the study was evidence of multicollinearity in the equation of dissatisfaction. Further research is warranted to delve into the relationships among different types of cognitive (perceptions of justice and disconfirmation) and affective responses (emotion) in influencing customers' dissatisfaction with penalties.
Finally, future studies could expand the scope of this area of research. This study examined one form of punitive actions, penalties (economic sanctions), which are the most common form of punitive action in the customerfirm relationship. Future studies may examine other types of punitive actions such as denial of services and removal of privileges and their effects on customers' evaluations. Also, the examination of a service organization's concurrent use of "penalty" and "reward" programs may prove intriguing. For example, some video rental organizations use both penalties (e.g., late-return fee) and reward programs (e.g., early return of the video entitles $1 credit toward the next movie rental) in an attempt to encourage customers to behave in a desirable way. Future studies may compare the effects of these two programs on customers' evaluations and behaviors and examine their effectiveness.
